Suchergebnisse

1. The primacy of justice -- 2. Constructing the principles of justice -- 3. Defending democratic equality : the argument from the original position -- 4. Pluralism and political consensus : the argument for political liberalism -- 5. A reasonable law of peoples for a real world.

Faced with the present migrant crisis and the dismal record of Europe in protecting vulnerable refugees' and migrants' rights, what could be the view of the moral philosopher? The contrast between the principles enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the reality of present policies is shocking, but more scrutiny will show that it is the result of a larger trend towards an understanding of freedom mostly in economic terms, at a time when economists such as Amartya Sen have revised their approach to economic growth and prosperity, noting the central role played by a much richer conception of freedom. The paper will scrutinize these inconsistencies and the conception of the person from which they derive and will provide an alternative and more coherent moral vision that could strengthen the legitimacy of the European Charter, at a time of growing dissatisfaction and so-called democratic deficit. Such a vision could help reconnect the Charter with a conception of the human person as in need not solely of passive legal protection, but also of active promotion of her self-respect and capabilities, and of her aspiration to a valuable life.

Résumé La distinction établie par Rawls entre doctrines « compréhensives » et conceptions politiques induit que, dans un état laïc, les valeurs religieuses ne peuvent jouer un rôle direct dans l'espace politique sans menacer l'égalité des différentes conceptions de la vie bonne auxquelles adhèrent les citoyens. Mais qu'en est-il des doctrines philosophiques ou morales comme celle de la laïcité ? La conséquence logique de la distinction établie par Rawls est que tous les citoyens, laïcs ou religieux, sont obligés en raison de leur devoir de civilité, de recourir à des raisons publiques dans le débat politique, un point problématique pour définir une conception libérale de la laïcité. Rawls répond de manière paradoxale, dans « La raison publique revisitée », à cette difficulté consiste à dire qu'on ne peut pas défendre l'Etat laïc sur la base de la doctrine de la laïcité. C'est cette alternative libérale à la laïcité, respectueuse de la pluralité et de l'égale dignité des doctrines compréhensives raisonnables, que cet article se propose de présenter.

Rawls distinction between "comprehensive" philosophical, moral and religious doctrines on the one hand, and "political" conceptions on the other hand, means that, in a secular State, citizens of faith are not allowed to use directly their religious arguments in the political sphere as this would threaten the equal dignity of their fellow citizens' conceptions of the Good. But what about a philosophical doctrine such as secularism or laicity? The logical consequence of Rawls's distinction is that every citizen, religious or secular, has to use public reasons in the political debate in application of his duty of civility. This raises the problematic issue of a liberal conception of secularism. In a Public Reason Revisited, Rawls paradoxically claims that the secular State cannot be defended on the basis of secularism. This essay proposes to explore this liberal alternative to secularism, concerned with the plurality and equal dignity of comprehensive reasonable doctrines. Adapted from the source document.

International audience ; The fairly recent opening of Western Europe in the last thirty years to North-South significant migratory fluxes, has clearly shown the deficiencies, or even the absence of, satisfactory immigration policies in the majority of European countries. A major political and social crisis is threatening, not least in France with the rise of the National Front, which gained 21% of the vote in the Presidential election last year, thanks to a campaign based on xenophobia and attacks on immigrants. These facts are well known. I would like to concentrate on conceptual questions and on the shortcomings of our democratic model. When we think about citizenship in this new social and cultural context, are the traditional notions of nationhood, Nation-State, and nationality still applicable? Especially, in the case of France, is the strongly assimilatory and universalistic Republican model justified? Don't we need to think differently in order to properly welcome and integrate populations who cannot or do not want to assimilate in the way previous waves of immigrants were able to? I will claim that immigration and its twin problem, integration, need different conceptual resources. We are confronted with a structural problem that questions our way of thinking, our social structures and our political values. This is no passing crisis due to a particular conjuncture. Immigrants are there to stay.

The reception of Rawls in France has been an extremely complex story where forces of innovation have been, in the end, overwhelmed by the resistance of `philosophical nationalism'. This is surprising as, in many ways, France was going through tremendous changes and modernization at the time of the translation of A Theory of Justice in 1987. In that context, Rawls's project seemed to have something useful and suggestive to offer: bridging the gap between freedom and equality in a new version of social democracy, combining social justice and market efficiency, respecting the plurality of values within civil society and creating a consensus on democratic legitimacy. But the intellectual obstacles, represented mostly by the French idiosyncratic brand of republicanism, were to prove too strong to allow for a true `liberalization' of French intellectual and political life. Whereas a number of lawyers, economists and political scientists as well as proportion of the French civil service saw all the benefits of a rigorous engagement with Rawls, philosophers and the intelligentsia on the whole, with the exception of Paul Ricoeur, reacted negatively to Rawls.

The reception of Rawls in France has been an extremely complex story where forces of innovation have been, in the end, overwhelmed by the resistance of 'philosophical nationalism'. This is surprising as, in many ways, France was going through tremendous changes & modernization at the time of the translation of A Theory of Justice in 1987. In that context, Rawls's project seemed to have something useful & suggestive to offer: bridging the gap between freedom & equality in a new version of social democracy, combining social justice & market efficiency, respecting the plurality of values within civil society & creating a consensus on democratic legitimacy. But the intellectual obstacles, represented mostly by the French idiosyncratic brand of republicanism, were to prove too strong to allow for a true 'liberalization' of French intellectual & political life. Whereas a number of lawyers, economists & political scientists as well as proportion of the French civil service saw all the benefits of a rigorous engagement with Rawls, philosophers & the intelligentsia on the whole, with the exception of Paul Ricoeur, reacted negatively to Rawls. 1 Appendix. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications Ltd.]